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Executive Summary 
 
This report summarises the findings of research, commissioned by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG), into the impact of the New Homes Bonus (NHB) on the attitudes 
and behavior of planning officers, local government officials, elected members of councils, 
housebuilders and planning consultants, planning inspectors and community groups.  The findings 
from the work are informing a DCLG led interim evaluation of the NHB.  
 
The research employed a mixed methods approach. The views of planning officers were sought using 
an online survey of 353 Local Planning Authorities (LPAs). The survey generated 202 useable 
responses (57%). The views of other stakeholders were sought as part of 12 area-based case studies and 
via additional interviews with elected members, housebuilders and planning inspectors. The qualitative 
research involved a total of 99 in-depth (face-to-face or telephone) interviews. 
 
This approach has produced: 
• robust ,  s tat i s t i ca l ly  representat ive  at t i tudinal ev idence  from across the local authority sector 
in England in respect to the NHB; and has allowed us to explore the extent to which it is 
impact ing on at t i tudes and behaviours towards housing growth; 
• in-depth qual i tat ive  ev idence about the impact  o f  the NHB on att i tudes and behaviours  
amongst key actors in local planning for housing and has allowed us to explore the 
impl i cat ions o f  these  at t i tudes and behaviours for the process of decision-making and its 
outcomes. 
 
The key research questions addressed were: 
• what is the level of understanding and awareness of the NHB policy, including its potential 
and actual financial impact for their local authority?; 
• how, and to what extent, has the NHB influenced local authority attitudes towards new 
homes?;  
• how, and to what extent, has the NHB influenced behaviour and decision making that may 
impact on the number of new homes being made available?; 
• how has the NHB been implemented, including how the receipts have been spent? 
 
The key findings were: 
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1. The NHB is well understood by officers and key elected members within councils – it is 
described variously as simple, clear, flexible and transparent. NHB is perceived by 50% of 
planning officers to be a ‘powerful’ incentive and a further quarter (25%) feel that it may be too 
early to say what impact it is having. 
 
2. There was evidence from the case studies of support for the NHB princ iple  that new housing 
provision should be incentivized and rewarded through a funding bonus.   
 
3. The NHB has helped change attitudes already, although it is clear that this has not 
happened in isolation from other policy and market influences. Specifically, the NHB is 
perceived to have helped push housing up the policy agenda in many areas, especially with 
elected members. Almost 30% of planning officers agreed that the NHB had helped increase 
overall support for new homes.  The NHB has also begun to contribute to a change in 
culture and is seen as part of a package of pro-development policy changes. At this stage, 
however, it is generally viewed as less important than changes to the National Planning Policy 
Framework, the Community Infrastructure Levy, Planning Obligations and other policy 
mechanisms as a means of stimulating housing delivery.  
 
4. To date, there is little evidence of direct behaviour change in terms of planning decisions 
resulting from the introduction of the NHB. There has been very limited impact on local plans 
or on individual planning decisions at this point in time. So far, there has been a mismatch 
between the extent to which it is perceived to be an incentive and the impact on actual 
decision-making locally. Finance officers have been influenced most but they appear to 
have few levers with which to influence housing and planning decisions within their 
organisations. Finance officers have tended to be on the outside of the housing debate but 
there is evidence that the NHB has led to broader strategic and more coordinated discussions 
about planning and housing strategy within some local authorities that could become more 
significant in the future. This evidence is seen even in contexts with high demand and a 
historically cautious planning stance.  However the spatial pattern of these results suggests that 
the impact of the NHB varied significantly across different types of areas.  
 
The role and use of the NHB has not been generally communicated by local authorities to the 
public or to community groups. It is widely felt that the NHB has had a limited impact on 
increasing public support for new homes. In total only 10% of LPAs agreed that the NHB had 
helped increase support for new homes, although this was as high as 19% amongst Rural with 
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varying planning stance LPAs. Views on the extent to which this might change in the future are 
mixed. Several local government officials believe there may be more scope to use receipts to 
address community needs if/as receipt flows increase in the future. Planning consultants and 
housebuilders believe that community representatives may begin to ask for more information 
about the availability and use of receipts through the consultation processes.  There is a widely 
held view that such community incentives are ‘politically’ contentious. There is evidence of 
innovative practice in terms of devolving receipts to community groups but this is not linked 
directly to planning decisions in those communities. 
  
5. NHB receipts have mainly been used to maintain service levels as part of the general 
grant fund. Numerous interviewees highlight the pressure on council budgets and for many 
local authorities the top-sliced NHB does not represent new money.  For many authorities the 
NHB sums involved so far have been too small for major initiatives to have been introduced. 
However, the study suggests that there is a general aspiration to use the NHB to support 
growth and there are several examples of targeted use in innovative ways.  Councils particularly 
welcomed the flexibility of the NHB. Innovative use of the NHB is, however, limited by 
constraints on core council budgets and by uncertainty about the long-term future of the NHB. 
Discussions of best practice and innovation within and between councils have been very rare 
but there is a desire to share best practice. 
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The Impact of the New Homes Bonus on Attitudes and Behaviour 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This report summarises the findings of a study of the impact of the New Homes Bonus (NHB) on the 
attitudes and behavior of planning officers, local government officials, elected members of councils, 
housebuilders and planning consultants, planning inspectors and community groups.  The study was 
commissioned by DCLG as part of a wider internally led interim evaluation of the NHB.  Because the 
findings from this study form one input against a number that are informing the evaluation, this report 
presents headline findings and evidence rather than a formally written up evaluation report.     
 
The work of the study was informed by a technical advisory group that was established to inform the 
wider evaluation. The group provided views on various research inputs (e.g., topic guides, survey 
questionnaire), case study selection and draft findings and outputs. 
 
1.1. Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of the study was to produce: 
• robust, statistically representative attitudinal evidence from across the local authority 
sector in England in respect to the NHB; and has allowed us to explore the extent to which it 
is impacting on attitudes and behaviours towards housing growth; and 
• in-depth qualitative evidence about the impact of the NHB on attitudes and behaviours 
amongst key actors in local planning for housing and has allowed us to explore the 
implications of these attitudes and behaviours for the process of decision-making and its 
outcomes. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The key questions addressed were: 
• what is the level of understanding and awareness of the NHB policy, including its potential 
and actual financial impact for their local authority?; 
• how, and to what extent, has the NHB influenced local authority attitudes towards new 
homes?;  
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• how, and to what extent, has the NHB influenced behaviour and decision making that may 
impact on the number of new homes being made available?; 
• how has the NHB been implemented, including how the receipts have been spent? 
 
 
1.3  Structure of the Report 
 
The report is organised in three further sections. Section 2 outlines the research design and summarises 
the research methods used. Section 3 provides a summary of the main research findings. It draws 
together evidence from a survey of planning officers with information collected from in-depth case 
studies in a variety of localities and from interviews with national stakeholders. These findings address 
each of the key research questions in turn. Section 4 provides some brief conclusions. 
 
2. Research Approach and Methods 
 
2.1 Research Design 
 
The research employed a mixed methods approach. There were three key elements to the research 
design: 
• a quantitative survey of local planning officers;  
• twelve place-based case studies, each consisting of 5 to 12 in-depth interviews with a wide 
variety of local stakeholders including council officers (chief executives, housing, planning and 
finance officers); elected council members (including housing, planning and finance portfolio 
holders; and cross-party perspectives); local housebuilders and planning consultants; and 
community and resident groups; 
• in depth interviews and stakeholder consultation to ‘triangulate’ the ‘local’ findings with (i) 
elected members from outwith the case-study areas; and (ii) national housebuilders, planning 
consultants and planning inspectors. 
 
The research team also designed a typology of Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) (see Appendix 1 for 
more detail). The typology was constructed using data on economic and market performance, housing 
delivery, planning stance (based on applications, approvals and decision times, public finance and 
potential housing capacity). The data were grouped to form five composite indices for capacity, 
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demand, previous planning stance, current output, and financial stringency. These indices were analysed 
using cluster analysis and allowed us to identify five ‘types’ of LPA, alongside County Councils and 
National Park Authorities. These ‘types’ represent the score each LPA received for the indices and the 
normal characteristics of the LPAs in these groups. 
 
Descriptive names are used to represent the most common characteristics of each ‘type’, but the name 
may not describe every LPA within the type, for example some non-London LPAs match most closely 
the large number of London boroughs in the third type and are hence grouped with them under the 
name: London Metropolitan. The ‘types’ were given the following names: 
• Low demand urban; 
• High demand, cautious planning stance; 
• London Metropolitan; 
• Pro-development housing growth; 
• Rural with varying planning stance 
 
County Councils and National Parks have also been included as separate categories of respondent for 
the analysis. These types are indicated in italics throughout the report. 
 
The typology was used in four ways. First, it was used to monitor survey responses and to steer follow-
up activity. This allowed the research team to make telephone contact with LPAs from under-
represented sub-groups and helped ensure that the survey captured the heterogeneity within the LPA 
population. Second, it allowed the research team to explore the potential implications of under-
representation and to consider the case for weighting the data (see Appendix 2). Third, the typology 
was used to inform the selection of case studies. It allowed the research team to identify areas where, 
despite some similarities in conditions and policy stance, there have been differential levels of receipts 
or differential financial impacts. Fourth, the typology was used to explore patterns on the data. Much 
of the discussion that follows in section three of this report makes reference to differences between 
different ‘types’ of council area. 
 
2.2 National Survey of Planning Officers 
 
The online survey of planning officers was issued to 353 key staff contacts across all authorities in 
England. The chief executive (or equivalent) and chief planning officer (CPO) (or equivalent) were 
contacted one week in advance of the survey and were invited to provide the contact details for the 
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planning officer who was best placed to complete the survey. Where details were provided, the survey 
was sent directly to the key contact. In all other cases the survey was sent to the chief planning officer. 
The survey was issued by email and was accessed via an embedded web link. It was developed using the 
LimeSurvey platform. The survey was designed to take between 15 and 20 minutes to complete. 
Responses were submitted during a three-week period over the months of February and March 2014. 
Survey recipients were issued with reminders on a weekly basis and each authority was contacted by 
telephone at least once by a member of the research team. This led to revisions to the mailing list and 
ensured, as far as possible, that the survey was routed to an officer who was equipped and empowered 
to respond. This process generated 202 (57%) useable responses (see below). 
 
Table 2.1 Survey response rate 
Type Number of 
responses 
Number in type Percentage of 
responses 
Low demand urban  55 93 59.1% 
High demand, cautious planning stance 41 79 51.9% 
London Metropolitan  17 34 50.0% 
Pro-development housing growth  32 46 69.6% 
Rural with varying planning stance 37 64 57.8% 
County Councils 13 28 46.4% 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 7 9 77.8% 
Total 202 353 57.2% 
 
The highest response rates came from Pro-development housing growth authorities (70%), Low demand urban 
areas (59%) and Rural with varying planning stance authorities (58%). The lowest response rates came from 
High demand, cautious planning areas (52%), London Metropolitan (50%) and County Councils (46%).  
 
Table 2.2 Response rate by receipts level (per capita) 
Type Frequency Number in type Percentage of responses in type 
Quartile1 (£16.91-98.08) 56 86 65.1% 
Quartile2 (£12.98-16.90) 48 86 55.8% 
Quartile3 (£9.28-12.97) 47 86 54.7% 
Quartile4 (£0-9.27) 43 86 50.0% 
 
There was similarly good coverage across areas receiving different levels of receipts (see Table 2.2). The 
possible respondents (excluding NPAs) were ordered by the level of receipts per household over the 
last three years and were assigned to different quartiles. The highest response rate (65%) comes from 
the upper quartile (those with the highest receipts per capita). The response rate for the other quartiles 
is very similar (ranging from 50% to 56%). 
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The high response rate relative to other studies of this type and the good coverage of each of the LPA 
types and across receipts levels provides a high degree of confidence that the survey results are 
representative and reliable (see Appendix 3 for a discussion of the modest difference that might be 
made by weighting the results). The responses provide a robust overview of the level of understanding 
of the NHB and the impacts on attitudes and behaviour evident to planning officers. 
 
2.3 Case Study Approach and Selection 
 
The case study element of the project was designed to add depth to the survey analysis. Specifically the 
case studies allowed the research: 
• to consider the views of a wider variety of stakeholders (i.e beyond planning officers) of the 
impact on attitudes and behavior in relation to housing delivery; 
• to better understand what might be underpinning the attitudes and behaviour exposed by the 
survey questions; 
• to help understand the complex inter-play between the NHB and other policy mechanisms; 
• to examine the differences between areas that exhibit a degree of similarity (in terms of market 
conditions, budgets, planning stance, etc) but appear to be performing at different levels; 
• to explore the way in which attitudes and behaviour are evolving and may adapt in the future. 
 
Twelve case studies were undertaken. The case study areas selected are summarised in Table 3 below. 
The selection of these cases was intended to achieve a balance between different types of authority, 
differences in financial outcomes, and geographic factors. There were at least 2 areas selected from 
each of the 5 ‘types’ of LPA identified from the classification analysis discussed in Appendix 1. We also 
took account of the performance of each LPA in terms of both the NHB receipts per capita and Net 
Financial Impact when the NHB receipts are taken into account alongside other changes to formula 
funding.  
 
Each case study began with a discussion with key stakeholders from local government (officers and 
members) and the development sector and then developed on a ‘snowballing’ basis. The mix of 
interview participants varies from case to case. For instance, community groups or registered providers 
were only interviewed where they had been engaged in discussion or debate about the NHB. Similarly, 
views from different political parties were sought where leadership had changed or cross-party debate 
about the NHB was prominent. The research team sought to interview to ‘exhaustion’ (that it to say, to 
the point at which it seemed unlikely that meaningful new evidence would emerge). 
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A total of 84 (face-to-face and telephone) in-depth interviews were undertaken at an average of 7 
interviews per case study area. The number of interviews in each case ranged from 4 in Low demand 
urban (3), where the NHB receipts have been low and debate limited, to 10 in Rural with varying planning 
stance (1), where debates about implementation and receipt use have been more extensive. The majority 
of participants were council officers but the interviews involved a total of 20 elected members and 11 
local housebuilders/development sector representatives.  The case study fieldwork took place over the 
months of February through to April 2014. 
 
Table 2.3 Case study selection and interviews 
Council Type 
(identification 
number) 
Net 
financial 
contribution 
quartile 
NHB 
receipts per 
capita 
quartile 
Interview Participants 
Low demand urban 
(1) 
4th 2nd 7 – Planning Officer (2), Finance Officer (1), Finance Director (1), 
Elected Member (1), Builder (1), Social Landlord (1) 
Low demand urban 
(2) 
4th 4th  9 – Head of Strategy & Performance (1), Planning officers (3), 
Policy Officer (2), Finance (1), Housing (1), Elected Member (1) 
Low demand urban 
(3) 
4th 4th  4 – Planning (1), Housing (1), Finance (1) officers; Community 
Group (1) 
High Demand, 
Cautious Planning 
(1) 
3rd 2nd  5 –Planning (1), Finance (1), Housing (1) officers; Elected Member 
(1); Builder (1) 
High Demand, 
Cautious Planning 
(2) 
2nd 1st  8 – Planning (1), Finance (1), Elected Member (3), Builder (3) 
High Demand, 
Cautious Planning 
(3) 
2nd 4th  9 – At District: Planning (1), Development (1), Finance (1) 
officers; Builder (1), Registered Provider (1), Elected Members (2);        
At county: Planning Officer (1), Partnership Manager (1) 
London 
Metropolitan (1) 
3rd 3rd  5 – Planning Officer (1), Elected Members (2), Finance Director 
(1), Community Group (1) 
London 
Metropolitan (2) 
1st 1st  6 – Planning Officer (1), Housing Officer (1), Finance Director 
(1), Registered Provider (1), Elected Members (2) 
Pro-development 
housing growth (1) 
2nd 1st  7 – Chief Executive (1), Finance Director (1), Infrastructure (1), 
Housing (1) and Planning (2) Officers; and (1) Elected Member (1) 
Pro-development 
housing growth (2) 
1st 2nd  6 – Chief Executive (1), Finance Officers at LA and County (2), 
Planning Policy Officer (1), Elected Members (2) 
Rural with varying 
planning stance (1) 
3rd 1st  10 - Planning (2), Development (1), Finance Officer (1); Elected 
Members (3), Builders (3) 
Rural with varying 
planning stance (2) 
2nd 3rd  8 - Housing Officer (2), Planning Officer (1), Finance Officer (1) 
at LA; Elected Members (2); Planning Officer at County (1); 
Builder (1) 
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2.4 In-depth Interviews with Elected Members and National Stakeholders 
 
Several additional in-depth interviews were conducted over and above those undertaken in the case 
study contexts. These were designed to corroborate the evidence emerging from the survey analysis and 
case study research. There were three separate tasks involved in this element of the research design. 
 
First, we sought to interview a range of elected members from outside the case study areas. This was 
intended to broaden coverage of elected member views providing additional confidence in the evidence 
generated from the survey and case studies. In total the research team conducted 8 in-depth telephone 
interviews with members, following up on all responses to national invitations for elected member 
involvement in the project. The interviews asked about their views of the NHB; the NHB and 
attitudinal change within the local authority area; its significance relative to other factors; NHB impact 
on planning decisions; and issues related to the use of receipts.  
 
Second, five interviews were undertaken with national housebuilders and planning consultants to 
capture their perspective on the extent to which the NHB was impacting on builders and on other 
stakeholders. We also sought their views on differences between different localities.  
 
Third, members of the Planning Inspectorate were consulted on their impressions of the impact of the 
NHB. Specifically we explored their views of the behaviour of LPAs and we examined the extent to 
which the NHB was being introduced into the decision-making process by developers or residents. The 
interviews also explored the extent to which the NHB is being given weight as a material consideration. 
Two inspectors submitted views, although they were clear that they were doing so in a personal 
capacity and not representing the views of the Planning Inspectorate. 
 
The evidence from these 15 interviews has been woven into the key findings reported below, alongside 
the evidence from the other 84 interviews and 202 survey responses. 
 
3.  Key Findings 
 
This section of the report outlines the key research findings from the study. It considers in turn the 
level of understanding and awareness of the NHB policy; how, and to what extent, the NHB has 
influenced attitudes towards new and newly made available homes; the extent to which the NHB has 
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influenced behaviour and decision-making in planning for housing; and the ways in which the NHB 
has been implemented. 
 
3.1  Understanding of the New Homes Bonus 
 
3.1.1 Understanding within Councils 
 
The relevant officers (planning, housing and finance), senior leadership teams and key elected members 
(leaders, chairs of planning committee) are generally well informed about the NHB and its financial 
implications.  
 
Table 3.1 Understanding of the NHB 
To what extent do you agree with the 
statements? 
  
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % N % No. % 
I have a good understanding of the NHB and its 
role in helping to facilitate housing growth 193 97.5 5 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 193 100.0 
It is relatively simple to calculate the revenue that 
would derive from the NHB 149 75.3 22 11.1 24 12.1 3 1.5 125 72.3 
I have a good understanding of the likely overall 
impact of the NHB on the finances of my 
council? 
171 85.9 19 9.5 8 4.0 1 0.5 163 91.1 
 
Ninety-eight percent of responding planning officers felt that they had a good understanding of the 
NHB and its role in helping to facilitate housing growth.  Perceptions of a good level of understanding 
of the NHB rose to 100% for Pro-development housing growth areas, County Councils and National Park 
Authorities (Table 3.2).  
 
Only 12% of responding planning officers disagreed that it was relatively simple to calculate the 
potential NHB revenue from development, and only 4% felt that they did not have a good 
understanding of the overall financial implications for their local authority. Chairs of planning 
committees and planning officers are aware that supporting new housing provision is important for 
local authority finance. 
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Table 3.2 Planning officers’ understanding of the NHB by authority type of LPA 
To what extent do you agree with the 
statement “I have a good understanding of 
the NHB and its role in helping to facilitate 
housing growth”? 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 193 97.4 5 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 193 100.0 
Low demand urban  53 98.1 1 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 53 100.0 
High demand, cautious planning stance 38 97.4 1 2.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 100.0 
London Metropolitan  15 88.2 2 11.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 15 100.0 
Pro-development housing growth  32 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 32 100.0 
Rural with varying planning stance 36 97.3 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 36 100.0 
County Councils 12 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 100.0 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 7 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 100.0 
 
Taken together, the survey responses and qualitative evidence suggest that the NHB is viewed as being 
simple, transparent and flexible.  
 
3.1.2 Housebuilders’ Understanding 
 
Forty one per cent of responding authorities felt that housebuilders in their area had a good 
understanding of the NHB and only 16% felt that this was not the case.   
 
Table 3.3 Housebuilders’ understanding of the NHB resulting from new development 
To what extent do you agree with the statement? 
  
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
/ Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
In my council area house builders have a good 
understanding of the NHB that would result 
from new development 
81 40.7 59 29.6 31 15.6 28 14.1 50 44.6 
 
Qualitative interviews revealed that major housebuilders and planning consultants have a very clear 
understanding of the NHB and have developed strategies for using the NHB in targeted negotiations 
with local authorities. Understanding is more mixed amongst smaller local and regional housebuilders.   
 
 
3.2.  The Impact of the New Homes Bonus on Attitudes 
 
This section of the report explores the extent to which the NHB is perceived as an incentive to support 
housing delivery. It also explores the impact of the NHB on levels of support observed by planning 
officers for new building, affordable housing and empty homes. Planning officers were also asked to 
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consider the attitudes of elected members, housebuilders and community groups. These views were 
crosschecked in interviews at the local and national level. 
 
 
3.2.1 The NHB as an Incentive 
 
Table 3.4 NHB as a powerful incentive for my council in helping to facilitate housing growth by type of 
LPA 
The NHB is a powerful incentive 
for my council in helping to 
facilitate housing growth 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 98 48.5 44 21.8 51 25.2 2 1.0 47 31.5 
Low demand urban  27 50.9 13 24.5 13 24.5 0 0.0 14 35.0 
High demand, cautious planning stance 17 42.5 9 22.5 12 30.0 2 5.0 5 17.2 
London Metropolitan  7 43.8 6 37.5 3 18.8 0 0.0 4 40.0 
Pro-development housing growth  21 65.6 3 9.4 8 25.0 0 0.0 13 44.8 
Rural with varying planning stance 22 59.5 10 27.0 5 13.5 0 0.0 17 63.0 
County Councils 4 30.8 3 23.1 6 46.2 0 0.0 -2 -20.0 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 
0 0.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 0 0.0 -4 
-
100.0 
 
Almost half of all responding authorities (49%) feel that the NHB fulfills its aim of being a ‘powerful 
incentive to facilitate housing growth’. Within this group 36 authorities (18%) strongly agreed with the 
statement. Only 25% felt that the NHB was not acting as a powerful incentive for housing growth.  A 
further 22% neither agreed nor disagreed that the NHB is a powerful incentive. The qualitative 
evidence suggests that the “don’t know” responses might reflect a view that it is too early for those 
respondents to make a clear assessment. 
 
Perceptions that the NHB is a powerful incentive for housing growth rise to 66% in Pro-development 
housing growth and 60% in Rural with varying planning stance areas.  The impact of the incentive is less 
marked in High demand, cautious planning stance and in London, though it is still felt to be a powerful 
incentive for at least 43% of responding authorities amongst those types. London Metropolitan authorities 
tend to be more equivocal about the impact of the NHB incentive, with 38% responses registering 
neither agree nor disagree.  Responses are most polarised in the High demand, cautious planning stance 
authorities with 43% agreeing that the NHB had been a powerful incentive and 30% in disagreement.  
County Council respondents were noticeably less positive about the power of the NHB in incentivising 
housing growth. 
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Respondents in areas with higher receipts per capita tended to be more positive about the power of the 
NHB incentive (62% agreement from those in the upper quartile of receipts against 49% agreement 
from those in the lowest quartile), although the relationship is not directly linear. 
 
Table 3.5 The NHB as a powerful incentive in housing growth by quartile of NHB receipts per capita 
The NHB is a powerful incentive for my council in 
helping to facilitate housing growth 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 98 48.5 44 21.8 51 25.2 47 48.0 
Quartile1 (£16.91-98.08) 34 61.8 11 20.0 9 16.4 25 58.1 
Quartile2 (£12.98-16.90) 26 55.3 11 23.4 9 19.1 17 48.6 
Quartile3 (£9.28-12.97) 16 35.6 14 31.1 15 33.3 1 3.2 
Quartile4 (£0-9.27) 21 48.8 8 18.6 14 32.6 7 20.0 
 
 
 
3.2.2  The Impact on Overall Support for New Homes  
 
The extent to which support for new housing has increased due to the NHB varies by the type of 
housing provided and by the type of local planning authority. A “net agree” score is used to help 
illustrate the strength and balance of support across respondents by subtracting the number of 
authorities disagreeing from those agreeing.  The most positive net agree score relates to the impact of 
the NHB on reducing the number of empty homes. The NHB is seen as having more frequently 
influenced members than community groups. 
 
Table 3.6 Support for housing delivery 
To what extent to you agree with the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for new 
homes being built within my council area 77 38.9 46 23.2 73 36.9 4 2.7 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for new 
affordable homes being built within my council area 57 28.8 53 26.8 82 41.4 -25 -18.0 
The NHB has helped reduce the number of empty homes 
in my council area 91 46.7 40 20.5 54 27.7 37 25.5 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for new 
homes within the local community 20 10.2 49 24.9 116 58.9 -96 -70.6 
Overall the NHB has resulted in my elected members 
being more supportive of new house building 76 39.2 46 23.7 64 33.0 12 8.6 
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Impact on Support for New Homes 
 
Table 3.6 suggests that the NHB is helping to slightly increase overall support for new housebuilding in 
a large number (39%) of local authorities. There is a small positive net agree score with more 
authorities agreeing to this statement than disagreeing. 
 
There is some variation between LPA types. Pro-development housing growth (50%), Rural with varying 
planning stance (46%) and High demand, cautious planning stance (43%) authorities are more likely to agree 
that overall support for new housebuilding has increased; while London Metropolitan (31%) and County 
Councils (23%) are less likely to agree (Table 3.7).   
 
Table 3.7 NHB impact on overall support for new homes by authority type of LPA 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for new 
homes being built within my council area 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree 
Score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 77 38.9 46 23.2 73 36.9 4 2.0 
Low demand urban  19 35.8 17 47.2 17 32.1 2 5.6 
High demand, cautious planning stance 17 42.5 5 14.3 18 45.0 -1 -2.9 
London Metropolitan  5 31.3 7 87.5 3 18.8 2 25.0 
Pro-development housing growth  16 50.0 2 6.7 14 43.8 2 6.7 
Rural with varying planning stance 17 45.9 10 37.0 10 27.0 7 25.9 
County Councils 3 23.1 3 33.3 6 46.2 -3 -33.3 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 0 0.0 2 40.0 5 71.4 -5 -100.0 
 
Table 3.8 The NHB impact on overall support for new homes by quartile receipts per capita 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for new 
homes being built within my council area 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree 
Score 
 
No. % No. % No. No. No. % 
ALL 77 38.9 46 23.2 73 36.9 4 2.0 
Quartile1 (£16.91-98.08) 23 42.6 12 22.2 18 33.3 5 12.2 
Quartile2 (£12.98-16.90) 28 59.6 7 14.9 12 25.5 16 40.0 
Quartile3 (£9.28-12.97) 14 30.4 14 30.4 18 39.1 -4 -12.5 
Quartile4 (£0-9.27) 11 25.6 11 25.6 20 46.5 -9 -29.0 
 
There are also differences between LPAs who have received different levels of NHB payments. Local 
authorities in the second quartile by receipts per capita tend to have seen the most significant change in 
attitudes to new homes (60% agreement, compared with 43% for first quartile and under 31% for 
quartiles 3 and 4) (Table 3.8). The net agree scores are much lower for low revenue recipients. 
 
 
17 
Impact on Support for Affordable Homes 
 
The NHB payment might be expected to offer a particular incentive to support affordable housing by 
offering a higher payment per additional unit.  However, only 29% of responding authorities agreed 
that the NHB has helped increase overall support for new affordable homes; 41% of respondents 
disagreed that the NHB has led to an increase in overall support for new affordable housing and with 
those who neither agreed nor disagreed a total of 68% did not agree that they have seen a positive 
change.  There were some differences in views between LPA types. The NHB appears to have had 
more of an impact on support for affordable housing in London Metropolitan and in Pro-development housing 
growth authorities. 
 
Table 3.9: Support for affordable homes by type of LPA  
The NHB has helped increase overall support for 
new affordable homes being built within my 
council area 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 57 28.8 53 26.8 82 41.4 -25 -12.6 
Low demand urban  13 24.5 19 35.8 21 39.6 -8 -23.5 
High demand, cautious planning stance 12 30 8 20 19 47.5 -7 -22.6 
London Metropolitan  6 37.5 4 25 5 31.3 1 9.1 
Pro-development housing growth  14 43.8 3 9.4 14 43.8 0 0.0 
Rural with varying planning stance 10 27 3 8.1 12 32.4 -2 -9.1 
County Councils 2 15.4 3 23.1 5 38.5 -3 -42.9 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 0 0 1 14.3 6 85.7 -6 -100.0 
 
The in-depth interviews suggest that the majority of local authorities were already very supportive of 
the principle of new affordable housing, though they lacked the financial and policy levers to influence 
the delivery of affordable housing.  Evidence from the survey and case studies suggests that numerous 
local authorities are now using the NHB receipts to support additional affordable housing, although the 
initiatives tend to be fairly small-scale. 
 
 
Impact on Empty Homes 
 
The NHB is felt to have had a positive impact on reducing the number of empty homes in 47% of 
authorities, and no impact on reducing empty homes in 28% of authorities. This is consistent with 
qualitative evidence that the NHB offers significant incentives for local authorities to invest in empty 
homes support.  The impact has been largest in Pro-development housing growth and Rural with varying 
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planning stance authorities but has also been particularly important in Low demand urban areas where new 
building has been limited.  
 
Table 3.10: Impact on the number of empty homes by type of LPA 
The NHB has helped reduce the number of empty 
homes in my council area 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 91 46.7 40 20.5 54 27.7 37 25.5 
Low demand urban  22 41.5 15 28.3 13 24.5 9 25.7 
High demand, cautious planning stance 18 45 9 22.5 12 30 6 20.0 
London Metropolitan  7 43.8 2 12.5 6 37.5 1 7.7 
Pro-development housing growth  19 59.4 2 6.3 10 31.3 9 31.0 
Rural with varying planning stance 22 59.5 3 8.1 7 18.9 15 51.7 
County Councils 3 25 3 25 2 16.7 1 20.0 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 0 0 1 20 4 80 -4 -100.0 
 
There is a stronger correlation between the extent to which authorities agreed the NHB had reduced 
the number of Empty Homes and Council’s who received above average levels of NHB receipts per 
capita than for lower receipt authorities.  
 
Table 3.11 Impact on the number of empty homes by receipts 
The NHB has helped reduce the number of empty 
homes in my council area 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 91 46.7 40 20.5 54 27.7 37 25.5 
Quartile1 (£16.91-98.08) 30 55.6 9 16.7 13 24.1 17 39.5 
Quartile2 (£12.98-16.90) 28 59.6 9 19.1 9 19.1 19 51.4 
Quartile3 (£9.28-12.97) 18 39.1 13 28.3 13 28.3 5 16.1 
Quartile4 (£0-9.27) 15 35.7 8 19.0 14 33.3 1 3.4 
 
 
Impact on Support for New Homes from the Community 
 
The NHB is perceived to have had very limited impact on community support for housing 
development to date. The highest impact was found to be in Rural with varying planning stance authorities, 
London Metropolitan and Pro-development housing growth authorities and the lowest in the market-constrained 
Low demand urban authorities.  
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Table 3.12 The NHB impact on overall support for new homes within the local community by type of LPA 
The NHB has helped increase overall support for 
new homes within the local community 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Net agree score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 20 10.2 49 24.9 116 58.9 -96 -70.6 
Low demand urban  2 3.7 17 31.5 32 59.3 -30 -88.2 
High demand, cautious planning stance 4 10 11 27.5 25 62.5 -21 -72.4 
London Metropolitan  2 12.5 1 6.3 11 68.8 -9 -69.2 
Pro-development housing growth  4 13.3 7 23.3 18 60 -14 -63.6 
Rural with varying planning stance 7 18.9 3 8.1 19 51.4 -12 -46.2 
County Councils 1 7.7 3 23.1 6 46.2 -5 -71.4 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 0 0 2 28.6 5 71.4 -5 -100.0 
 
The in-depth interviews suggest that public awareness of the NHB was felt to be extremely limited, and 
local authorities do not promote the NHB to the public.  In one of the case studies, amenity groups 
closely involved in planning decisions were unaware of the NHB. Local authorities that have devolved 
funding to parish councils/community groups suggest that citizens tend to see the resource as public 
money rather than a specific NHB contribution linked to new housing.   
 
There has been some local media coverage of the NHB in most of local authority areas but its impact 
has been limited. Local authorities are concerned that local media coverage might distort public debate 
by misrepresenting the scale of NHB funding and its impact on planning decisions. 
 
In general the extent to which the NHB receipts should be linked to specific applications was a source 
of debate. Housebuilders felt strongly that the NHB ought to be a stronger material consideration 
when planning applications were being considered and decided. Planning officers, on the other hand, 
felt that this would be unhelpful. NHB receipts are generally not being spent on issues directly related 
to the development under consideration, but contribute to wider financial issues. The Planning 
Inspectorate had not yet had to deal with many cases that raised the NHB as an issue and were clear 
that the NHB would not typically be seen as a significant material consideration when considering or 
decision on applications.  
 
3.2.3 The Attitudinal Change Process 
 
It is notable that a larger number of respondents perceive the NHB to be a powerful incentive than 
believe that the policy has increased levels of support for new homes.  
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Table 3.13: The relationship between the perceived “power” of the NHB incentive and impact on 
attitudes 
To what extent do you agree with the statements? 
  
 
The NHB is a powerful incentive 
for my council in helping to 
facilitate housing growth 
Strongly Agree 
/ Agree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The NHB has helped increase overall support 
for new homes being built within my council 
area 
Strongly Agree / Agree 66.3 9.8 
Disagree / Strongly Disagree 12.2 82.4 
TOTAL (78.6) (92.2) 
The NHB has helped increase overall support 
for new affordable homes being built within 
my council area 
Strongly Agree / Agree 46.9 7.8 
Disagree / Strongly Disagree 17.3 84.3 
TOTAL (64.3) (92.2) 
The NHB has helped reduce the number of 
empty homes in my council area 
Strongly Agree / Agree 69.1 13.7 
Disagree / Strongly Disagree 9.3 60.8 
TOTAL (78.4) (74.5) 
The NHB has helped increase overall support 
for new homes within the local community 
Strongly Agree / Agree 18.6 0.0 
Disagree / Strongly Disagree 34.0 96.1 
TOTAL (52.6) (96.1) 
Overall the NHB has resulted in my elected 
members being more supportive of new house 
building 
Strongly Agree / Agree 64.3 5.9 
Disagree / Strongly Disagree 12.2 33.3 
TOTAL (76.5) (39.2) 
 
Table 3.13 cross-tabulates the responses to the question about the “power” of the incentive against the 
questions on its impact on support for new homes and empty homes. Around two-thirds of those who 
agree that the NHB is a powerful incentive appear to agree that it is beginning to influence attitudes. 
The remainder do not and around 1 in 10 actually disagree that the NHB is increasing support for 
housing. Arguably, this points towards a lag between policy implementation and its subsequent impact 
on attitudes. This is a view that has been corroborated by the qualitative case study findings. Numerous 
interviewees suggested that the policy is still bedding in and that attitudes and behaviour are still 
evolving.  
 
The qualitative research offers some insights into what might be beginning to shape the attitudes 
revealed from the survey. All of the case-study authorities reported that they had become more 
accepting of housing development over the previous 5-10 years.  In this respect the NHB is part of a 
number of factors that are encouraging and supporting a more proactive approach to new 
housebuilding, though it is not necessarily driving that change.  The provision of new housing (and 
associated affordable housing) is generally seen as the “right thing to do” because of local, regional and 
national housing need.  The economic and social benefits of housing development are also recognised.  
In this respect there was a degree of support for the NHB principle that new housing provision should 
be incentivised and rewarded through a funding bonus.   
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It was frequently made clear that the NHB is not operating in isolation. Rather the NHB is seen as part 
of a package of pro-development policy changes, although at this stage, it is generally viewed as less 
important than changes to the National Planning Policy Framework, the Community Infrastructure 
Levy, Planning Obligations and other policy mechanisms as a means of stimulating housing delivery.    
 
Attitudinal change in local authorities is perhaps most significant amongst members and officers not 
previously closely engaged in or exercised about planning decisions, including chief executives, finance 
directors but also many elected council members.  The NHB is widening and sharpening strategic 
debate within local authorities about new housing. 
 
Overall there is evidence that, for various reasons, local authorities have been becoming progressively 
more supportive of new housebuilding over the last 10 years. The NHB is not directly shaping 
attitudes, but it was found to be a contributory factor within the study areas. The NHB has helped 
reinforce attitudinal shifts and in some cases the financial contribution has helped build political 
support for (and ease resistance to) a more supportive and proactive approach to new housing delivery.  
  
3.3  The Impact of the New Homes Bonus on Behaviour 
 
This research also explored the extent to which the NHB is thought have changed behaviour, to date. 
Specifically it examined behavioural change in relation to the development of local plans and in the 
context of decisions about individual planning applications. 
 
3.3.1 The NHB and Local Plans 
 
Planning officers were asked to record the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with three 
statements about behavior in relation to planning and local plan development. These were: 
 
1. The NHB has contributed to a more strategic and coordinated approach to new housing 
provision in my council; 
 
2. The NHB has been a significant factor in public consultation and discussion for my local 
plan; 
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3. The NHB has been an important influence on the number of new homes proposed or 
adopted in my local plan 
 
The results are summarised below. 
 
Table 3.14 The NHB impact on strategic approaches to planning and the local plan 
To what 
extent do you 
agree with the 
statements? 
Overall Plan adopted prior to 
1st November 2010 
Plan adopted on or 
after 1st November 
2010 
Plan is, to date, 
unadopted 
SA/A D/SD SA/A D/SD SA/A D/SD SA/A D/SD 
No % No % No % No % No % No % No % No % 
1 59 31 83 43 24 38 27 42 13 27 20 41 12 28 20 47 
2 10 5 134 72 2 3 41 64 3 6 45 88 3 7 28 67 
3 21 11 130 71 5 8 39 63 4 8 42 82 6 15 27 66 
 
 
Although the direct impact on local plan preparation has so far been limited, almost one third of 
responding authorities felt that the NHB had contributed to a more strategic and coordinated approach 
to new housebuilding within the local authority (see statement 1 in Table 3.14).  
 
It has only been in very rare circumstances that LPAs have considered the potential NHB receipts 
when setting housing targets for their local plan (see statement 3). Just 11% of LPAs appear to have 
considered the NHB in this context.  
 
One might expect that those authorities that had local plans adopted after the implementation of the 
NHB might be more likely to have been influenced by it.  However, results from the survey suggest 
that there is no suggestion that this influence might be more likely in localities where Plans have or 
have not yet been adopted. For local authorities plan making tends to be an ongoing process. 
 
The impact on public consultation and discussion has been even more limited (see statement 2). Just 
5% of authorities felt that the NHB had been a ‘significant factor’ in public consultation and discussion 
in relation to the local plan, and only 11% felt that the NHB had been an important influence on 
housing targets.   
 
The survey results are consistent with qualitative evidence that suggests that the NHB has only begun 
to have an impact on broader strategic thinking about housing provision. It was widely reported that 
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senior executive officers and elected members (chief executive, finance director, leader and executive) 
are taking greater interest in strategic decisions about planning for housing as a result of the NHB.   
 
It is worth noting, however, that the views from county councils and from planning officers operating 
in two tier authorities diverge from those in unitary authorities. These officers tend to disagree with the 
suggestion that the NHB has improved joint working. This is corroborated by qualitative evidence.  
 
Table 3.15 The NHB impact on joint working between districts & county councils 
To what extent do you agree with the 
statements? 
 
Strongly 
Agree / 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree / 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
know 
Net agree 
score 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
The NHB has led to better communication 
and negotiation between county and district 
councils in my area with regard to new 
housing 
19 16.1 42 35.6 55 46.6 2 1.7 -36 -48.6 
The NHB has led to better strategic 
coordination between county and district 
councils in my area on new house building 
17 14.5 42 35.9 56 47.9 2 1.7 -39 -53.4 
In general I am satisfied with the allocation 
of receipts between county and district 
councils in my area 
57 50.0 29 25.4 22 19.3 6 5.3 35 44.3 
 
 
The views of National Park Authorities (NPAs) also have a clear impact on the overall responses to the 
question about the impact on the strategic approach to planning. The response rate for National Parks 
was higher than average, with seven out of nine responding, although NPAs are a very small number 
when compared to all local authorities. The NHB is not distributed to NPAs, but goes directly to the 
district or county. Those authorities are expected to negotiate with the NPAs on an appropriate 
redistribution, given the NPAs role in granting planning permission. Against this backdrop, four of the 
seven NPA’s strongly disagreed that the NHB was a powerful incentive, whilst the remainder did not 
answer the question. This negative view of the impact of the NHB as an incentive was matched in 
questions about support for new homes, support for affordable homes, reducing the number of empty 
homes, community support and elected member support for house building. None of the NPA’s 
agreed that the NHB had contributed to a more strategic or coordinated approach to new housing or a 
significant factor in public consultation, with six disagreeing or strongly disagreeing to both. 
Unsurprisingly, no NPA agreed that the NHB receipts were considered by planning officers or elected 
members when considering planning applications given they do not have planning responsibilities. The 
evidence suggests that few NPAs have received any redistribution of the NHB. 
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3.3.2 The NHB and Planning Applications 
 
To date the NHB is having a limited impact on planning applications and decisions involving new 
homes. Just over 36% of responding authorities take the NHB into account ‘always’ or 
‘often/sometimes’. Members are thought to be slightly more likely to take account of receipts than 
officers. In contrast, it is more common that the NHB revenues have never been taken into account. 
Again there are differences in the impact on elected member behavior (where 44% never consider 
revenues) when compared with that of officers (57% never consider revenues). In-depth interviews 
suggest that this might change. It was noted that officers and members have become more relaxed 
about considering Section 106 and CIL and it was frequently suggested that views on the NHB are 
evolving. 
Table 3.16 The NHB and planning applications 
To what extent do you agree with the 
statements? 
  
Always / 
Almost 
always 
Often / 
Sometimes 
Always/Almost 
always / Often 
/Sometimes 
Never Don’t 
know 
No % No % No. % No % No. % 
How often do planning officers take into 
account revenues from the NHB when 
considering planning applications involving 
new homes? 
11 5.8 58 30.5 69 36.3 108 56.8 13 6.8 
How often do elected members take into 
account revenues from the NHB when 
considering planning applications involving 
new homes? 
6 3.2 66 35.1 72 38.3 82 43.6 34 18.1 
 
There is a little variation in behaviour between different LPA types. Relatively frequent 
(often/sometime) consideration of the NHB revenues in planning application is more likely amongst 
High demand, cautious planning stance authorities (Table 3.17). It is more likely that the NHB will ‘never’ 
have been considered in Low demand urban authorities. 
 
Table 3.17 The NHB impact on planning applications by type of LPA 
How often do planning officers take into 
account revenues from the NHB when 
considering planning applications 
involving new homes? 
Always / 
Almost 
always 
Often / 
Sometimes 
Always/Almost 
always / Often 
/Sometimes 
Never Don’t 
know 
No % No % No. % No % No % 
ALL 11 5.8 58 30.5 69 36.3 108 56.8 13 6.8 
Low demand urban  3 5.8 12 23.1 15 28.8 34 65.4 3 5.8 
High demand, cautious planning stance 2 5.1 19 48.7 21 53.8 15 38.5 3 7.7 
London Metropolitan  0 0.0 6 37.5 6 37.5 8 50.0 2 12.5 
Pro-development housing growth  2 6.3 10 31.3 12 37.5 19 59.4 1 3.1 
Rural with varying planning stance 3 8.3 10 27.8 13 36.1 22 61.1 1 2.8 
County Councils 1 11.1 1 11.1 2 22.2 4 44.4 3 33.3 
National Park Authorities (NPAs) 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 0 0.0 
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There does not appear to have been any meaningful difference in perceived behavior change on the 
basis of levels of receipts. Perhaps surprisingly the highest revenue authorities were more likely to have 
‘never’ considered potential receipts in the planning decision-making process. Although it should also 
be noted that the next highest receipts group (Quartile 2) were mostly likely to have taken receipts into 
account “always/almost always” (13%). However, national housebuilders and planning consultants 
have not observed any significant variations in behavior between authorities. 
 
Table 3.18 The NHB revenue and planning applications by NHB receipts per capita (amount in 
brackets) 
How often do planning officers take 
into account revenues from the NHB 
when considering planning 
applications involving new homes? 
Always / 
Almost 
always 
Often / 
Sometimes 
Always/Almost 
always / Often 
/Sometimes 
Never Don’t 
know 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
ALL 11 5.8 58 30.5 69 36.3 108 56.8 13 6.8 
Quartile1 (£16.91-98.08) 1 1.9 17 32.1 18 34.0 33 62.3 2 3.8 
Quartile2 (£12.98-16.90) 6 13.0 15 32.6 21 45.7 22 47.8 3 6.5 
Quartile3 (£9.28-12.97) 2 4.3 15 32.6 17 37.0 26 56.5 3 6.5 
Quartile4 (£0-9.27) 2 5.3 10 26.3 12 31.6 21 55.3 5 13.2 
 
Overall, it would appear while the NHB has begun to contribute to changing attitudes to housing 
delivery, this impact has been much more limited in relation to plan making or planning decisions to 
date. The in-depth interviews reveal a strong and consistent view from officers and members 
responsible for planning that the NHB contribution should not influence the requirement to make 
decisions in accordance with “law and planning policy”.   
 
 
3.4 Implementation and Use of Receipts 
 
Evidence from the survey and case studies suggests that the NHB receipts are mainly being used to 
support core services. The survey responses show that 60% of authorities use the NHB primarily for 
maintaining existing council services (Table 3.19).  Relatively few local authorities (16%) prioritise the 
use of the NHB to support aspects of housing provision (staff to support new housebuilding, staff to 
support bringing empty properties back into use, infrastructure for new housebuilding), although 
infrastructure for housing is a top 3 priority expenditure area for 21% of authorities. 
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Table 3.19 Use of the NHB receipts 
How are NHB receipts spent in your council? 
First / Top Top Three 
No. 
 
% (of 
respondents) 
No. % (of 
respondents) 
Staff to support new housebuilding 6 3.6 26 12.9 
Staff to support bringing empty properties back into use 4 2.4 32 15.8 
Infrastructure for new housebuilding 17 10.1 42 20.8 
Community facilities 3 1.8 22 10.9 
Passing monies to community groups to spend 7 4.1 29 14.4 
Maintaining existing council services 45 26.6 115 56.9 
Keeping council tax low 11 6.5 69 34.2 
My council treats NHB as a general grant and does not identify 
specific areas of spending 56 33.1 85 42.1 
 
 
The survey responses do not provide data on the significance of these figures in terms of the 
proportion of overall receipts or total spend. In the twelve case-study authorities only one authority 
(London Metropolitan (1)) is using the NHB wholly to cover core services and two authorities (Low demand 
urban (3) and Pro-development housing growth (1)) use all of the receipts for housing development initiatives.  
Low demand urban (1)’s receipts are used to fund pre-existing core housing initiatives.  The other nine 
case-study authorities allocate a relatively small proportion of their NHB receipts for a range of 
housing-related activities.   
 
The qualitative evidence suggests that there is pressure to use receipts for core services given cuts in 
local government funding.  Top-slicing of formula funding means that the NHB is generally not viewed 
as “new money” and is rarely seen as a ‘bonus’ that might be allocated to new initiatives. Local 
authorities argue that they would be more willing to ringfence the NHB receipts for housing if there is 
a recognizable ‘extra’ (i.e. bonus) element. 
 
Decisions about the use of the NHB receipts are influenced by the impact of local government cuts in 
different areas, but mainly reflect political priorities within the local authority.  Planning officers report 
a degree of frustration with the fact that, in some local authorities, receipts are not being used to 
support planning for housing or housing delivery.   
 
The NHB is valued for its flexibility and the way it can be combined with other funding sources.  
However, in many authorities, it is argued that the NHB receipt levels, to date, are too small to make a 
significant difference and this is likely to be a particular issue for district authorities. 
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The use of the NHB receipts to support new housing has been most effective where existing delivery 
mechanisms are in place (for example, to support affordable housing in London Metropolitan (2), and 
infrastructure investment in Pro-development housing growth (1)).  
 
 
Devolving Funds to Communities 
 
Few of the responding authorities use NHB receipts for community facilities (2%) or community 
groups (4%) as their main priority.  These items are a little more likely to be in the top three priority 
uses but it is relatively rare for community uses to be high on the agenda. 
 
Two of the case-study areas devolve a proportion of the NHB receipts to communities. In High demand, 
cautious planning stance (2) this is 25% of total receipts and in Pro-development housing growth (2) it is £0.5m. 
The national interviews with elected members also revealed an authority that has devolved 40% of its 
NHB receipts to parish councils to support a range of community projects. In all of these cases the 
devolved funds are not linked directly to a willingness to accept new housing. 
 
The contribution of the NHB to core or general services is generally not promoted within local 
communities and local planning authorities are wary of the NHB being seen as a community “bribe” 
for development. Elected members and community representatives have tended not to make demands 
on NHB receipts. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The research project sought to provide a robust and representative evidence-base on the impact of the 
New Homes Bonus on the attitudes and behaviour of key stakeholders involved in planning and 
housing delivery. The research explored attitudes and behaviour using a mixed methods approach that 
involved collating survey responses from 202 planning officers and qualitative information, derived 
from twelve case studies and a series of national stakeholder discussions, that involved 99 interview 
participants, including 26 elected council members, 17 representatives of the development sector and 
14 public sector finance officers.  
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The study shows that, while many respondents feel that it is too early to assess the impact of the policy 
on attitudes, around half of all planning officers perceive the New Homes Bonus to be a powerful 
incentive to support housing delivery. 
 
The quantitative results suggest that, in most areas, this incentive has not yet been directly translated 
into a significant change in attitudes, however there is evidence that in some areas the NHB has helped 
reinforce attitudinal shifts towards becoming more supportive of new house building. To date, there 
has only been a relatively limited impact on changing behaviour in terms of plan making and planning 
decisions. The NHB has not typically been taken into account in developing plans or in setting targets 
for housing delivery. The NHB receipts are slightly more likely to be taken into account by elected 
members than planning officers but are generally not thought to be critical in decisions about individual 
planning applications. These decisions are still governed by “law and planning policy”.  The NHB was 
not seen to be a material consideration in planning decisions by many planning officers. It was 
frequently argued that the NHB might make a bigger difference to housing delivery if there was (at 
least some/more) ‘ring-fencing’ of receipts to support housing delivery, or if the NHB was linked more 
closely to the development site than general finance.  
 
Nevertheless the qualitative evidence suggests that the impact of the NHB has stimulated new thinking 
at the senior officer and leadership level within councils and is viewed as highly significant by finance 
officers. It is widely held that the NHB is working together with the wider package of pro-development 
changes to the National Planning Policy Framework and other initiatives to encourage more supportive 
attitudes towards development. 
 
Receipts from the NHB are seen by authorities as being extremely important. They are used in the 
main to supplement the general budget and are largely allocated for general use. Relatively few councils 
use significant proportions of their receipts to promote and support housing delivery at this point. The 
qualitative evidence suggests that there is increasing interest in best practice in the use of receipts and 
there is a general desire to use receipts more directly to support housing delivery.  
 
There has been limited engagement with the public and communities around the NHB. There is some 
limited evidence of devolving receipts to community groups but this is not linked directly to planning 
decisions in those communities. The limited engagement with communities is partly because the 
majority of receipts are allocated for general use, but there is also a concern that communities might see 
the NHB as a development “bribe”. 
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Overall, there was a strong sense that the policy is still bedding down and has begun to reinforce the 
impact other more significant pro-development policy changes. Although the NHB is not seen as a 
significant driver of attitudes and behavior in isolation, it seems possible that, as receipts levels change 
in the future, attitudes and behavior will continue to change. This, however, may be limited by a high 
degree of uncertainty about the future of the policy, may act as a constraint on new initiatives 
supported by the use of receipts. 
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Appendix 1: The Local Planning Authority Typology 
 
A1.1 Introduction 
The approach used to construct a Local Planning Authority (LPA) typology starts from the assumption 
that planned /actual housebuilding rates depend upon: 
a) Physical capacity of the local area to accommodate new housing, allowing for existing extent and 
intensity of urbanisation, and the amounts of land potentially available and not subject to 
overriding policy or environmental constraints; 
b) Demand for housing, including both open market demand and the need for housing from those 
unable to afford market prices, both now and in the future, having regard to forecast/projected 
growth in households, jobs etc; and  
c) The planning policy stance of the local planning authority, which will incorporate past 
regional/sub-regional guidance or commitments, and the LA’s own interpretation of a) and b), 
as well as its general preference. 
The analysis draws on data on a large number of indicators organised in terms of these three broad 
domains (‘capacity’, ‘demand’, ‘planning stance’). In relation to the actual ‘outputs’ of most interest – 
flow of new planning permissions, flow of housing completions – we include measures of the changes 
between the period up to 2007 and the period since then. Therefore we distinguish the ‘previous’ 
planning stance from the current position, which we hypothesize may have changed in at least some 
local authorities. To this we add a domain labelled ‘current output’ to capture recent measures of new 
consents and housing completions.  
The NHB is intended to provide a financial incentive by changing the amount of financial resources a 
local authority has available to support services. However, in the period of its introduction local 
government in England has been subject to substantial progressive cuts in the level of real resources 
available to support services. Often these cuts are much larger in magnitude than the potential gains 
from the NHB. We therefore also take account of the overall budgetary and grant position of local 
authorities as part of the process of choosing case studies or interpreting results. Some measures of 
change in spending power and actual budgetary change since 2010 were derived from a separate 
research study (Hastings et al, 2013) and have been used to form another domain indicator to take 
account of in the typology.  
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The analytical approach involves has classifying the indicators under the main domains sketched out 
above, and then to combine them in a relatively neutral, conventional fashion where each component 
gets an equal weight. This is achieved by taking the Z-scores of each variable (subtract mean, divide by 
standard deviation), adding them up and dividing by the number of components (x100). The resulting 
indices take values centring on 0 and ranging typically between -100 and +100.  
We use cluster analysis based on the five domain indicators (including budget stringency), one recent 
indicator of change in plan numbers, and the most recent new consents flow indicator to derive the 
final groups. This generates a classification with five substantive clusters and a reasonable spread of 
authorities between them.  
 
A1.2 Domains and Indicators 
The indicators included in each domain are set out below. (The + or – sign given before each indicator 
shows the direction of effect on the assumed overall domain index).  
Capacity 
• (+) Proportion of land area which is ‘green’/undeveloped (‘pgreenw’ –derived from 
Generalised Land Use Database, GLUD) 
• (-) Proportion of land area which is designated as Green Belt (‘pgreenbelt’ – provided by 
DCLG Planning Statistics) 
• (-) Proportion of housing build on previously developed, or ‘brownfield’, land (‘pdl’, derived 
from DCLG/OS Land Use Change Statistics, LUCS) 
• (-) Net residential density dwellings per hectare, dwelling-weighted average of small area values 
(‘netdens2’, derived from 2001 Census and GLUD residential building and garden footprint 
area) 
• (+) Sparsity of population, persons per hectare of total land area (‘spars01’, derived from 2001 
Census) 
• (+) Total land area, hectares (‘areaha’, 2001 Census) 
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Demand 
• (+) Percent household growth actually recorded 2001-2011 (‘phhgrwth0111’, Censuses of 
Population) 
• (+) Percent household growth projected 2011-21 (‘phhgrwth1121’, DCLG Interim Household 
Projections, 2012-based, published 2013) 
• (+) Average mix-adjusted house price 2007, £k (‘maprice7’ Land Registry, adjusted for type 
mix) 
•  (+) Median house price 2011, £k (‘mdprice11k’ Modelled from Regulated Mortgage Survey 
and Land Registry data)  
• (+) House price to income ratio, 2007 (‘hpir7’, based on average price and average estimated 
household income) 
• (+) House price to earning ratio, 2011 (‘hper11’, based on median price as above and median 
annual full time earnings of residents from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings) 
• (+) Median full time weekly earnings of residents 2011 (‘mede11a’, ASHE, averaged over 3 
years) 
• (+) Average annual gross household income £000, 2007 (‘hhinck7’, derived from proxy-based 
model, Bramley & Karley 2005)  
• (-) Proportion of people in low income poverty (‘imdlwincu’, IMD low income score indicator, 
based on number of people claiming income-related benefits or tax credits) 
• (-) Housing vacancy rate in 2006 (‘pvacp’, estimated from 2001 Census, and LA returns to 
DCLG based on Council Tax collection system)  
• (+) Households containing potential concealed households in 2011 (‘pconchhd’, based on 
household composition tables, 2011 Census) 
• (+) Growth in number of jobs by workplace 1998-2006 (‘wjallgr’, Annual Business Inquiry) 
• (+) Employment rate of working age residents 2011 (‘emprt11a’, based on Annual Population 
Survey, averaged over three years) 
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• (-) Unemployment rate for economically active people (pnem11a, based on Annual Population 
Survey, averaged over three years) 
• (-) Log of distance in km from Central London (‘ldist500k’, using grid centroids of areas) 
 
Planning Stance 
The previous planning stance of the local authority around 2007 is derived from work reported in 
Bramley & Watkins (forthcoming). That study calibrated a composite index of the planning stance by 
regressing the flow of new planning consents per 100 households against a range of variables and 
selecting those which were significant in at least some versions of the model. This indicator mainly 
comprises: 
• (+)  Composite indicator derived from the regression model in Bramley & Watkins as described 
above (‘plgstance4’, in units equivalent to the annual flow of planning permissions per 100 
households) 
• (+) Social completions per 100 households (‘pscmp7’, derived from CLG Local Housing 
Statistics Live Tables) 
• (+) Estimated Outstanding Planning Permissions for housing per 100 households (‘pdopp7’, 
derived from Emap-Glenigan database of larger housing sites) 
• (+) Percentage of ‘five year land supply’ available in local authority in 2009 (‘pct5yls’, from 
DCLG planning statistics live tables; note five years supply based on then-operative Regional 
Spatial Strategy target) 
• (+) Amount of land available for housebuilding, allocated in Local Plan or with outstanding 
planning permission, per 100 households (‘plav09’, based on previous indicator and the RSS 
numbers as compiled by Tetlow King or from Websites) 
• (+) Average success rate of planning applications for housing 1998-2007 (CLG ‘PS2’ Planning 
Statistics) 
• (+) Percentage change in local plan core strategy housing number between 2010 and 2012 
(‘tkpct’, as derived from Tetlow King Survey for the Policy Exchange, 2012) 
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Current Output 
The rationale of this domain is to pick up differences between the situation in 2007-09 and 
now/recently and reflect the current performance of local authorities in promoting local housebuilding. 
The indicators examined include: 
• Private completions per 100 households in 2012/13 (‘ppcmp12’, derived from DCLG Local 
Housing Statistics Live Tables Table 253) 
• Social completions per 100 households in 2012/13 (‘pscmp12’, derived as above) 
• Estimated planning permissions for housing (units) per 100 households averaged over the years 
Aug-July 2011-12 and 2012-13 (DCLG ‘PS2’ planning applications statistics Table P136, as 
supplied by DCLG). 
• NHB grant as percentage of total LA funding 2013/14 (‘pnhb13’, derived from DCLG NHB 
financial data supplied to project) 
• NHB grant as £ per head of population, 2013/14 (‘nhb13c’, derived as above) 
 
Financial stringency 
The final domain index developed relates to the budgetary position of the local authority resulting from 
the sequence of local government finance settlements since 2010 and the budgetary decisions of 
authorities. These measures are derived from a separate research project supported by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation looking at the impact of financial cutbacks on deprived groups and localities 
(Hastings et al, 2013). These estimates link data from official settlement data and CIPFA budgetary 
data, adjusting where possible for known system changes. The components of this index are as follows: 
• Change in total service expenditure per capita in nominal terms, 2010-13 (‘chtotsv13c’, derived 
from CIPFA Financial and General Statistics 2010/11 to 2013/14) 
• Percentage change in total nominal service expenditure, 2010-13 (‘pchtotsv13’, derived as 
above) 
• Change in transport expenditure per capita, 2010-13 (‘chtran13c’, derived as above) 
• Change in planning expenditure per capita, 2010-13 (‘chplg13c’, derived as above) 
• Estimated percentage real cut in spending power from 2010/11 original budget to 2014/15 
settlement (‘realcut14’, derived from DCLG Settlement Data and CIPFA original budget for 
2010/11) 
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A1.3 The LPA Typology 
The ‘types’ used in the study are developed from cluster analysis applied to the values on the five 
composite indices for capacity, demand, previous stance, current output, and financial stringency. Six 
clusters are extracted, of which one has only one member (Tower Hamlets) and may be ignored.  
Table A1 shows the average scores of each cluster on the key composite indices and some particular 
recent planning indicators. Cluster 1 has a moderately negative score on capacity (suggesting a more 
urban orientation), and strongly negative scores on demand and current output. The budget stringency 
indicator suggests quite a negative position for this group (high level of cuts), while the recent flow of 
planning permissions is the lowest for this group. Cluster 2 is slightly more negative on capacity, quite 
positive on demand, while having the most negative previous planning stance. However, the budget 
position of these authorities is relatively favourable. Cluster 3 has the most negative capacity scores, but 
the strongest demand indicator value, and as will be seen this cluster is strongly focused on London 
and surroundings. Cluster 4 has fairly positive capacity and demand, the most positive previous 
planning stance and very high current output, including the highest recent flow of permissions. These 
areas we characterised as established housing growth areas. Cluster 6 has the highest capacity score, 
indicating its predominantly rural character. Demand, planning stance and current output are 
moderately positive and the budget indicator is also only moderately negative.  
Table A1: Average Scores of Clusters on Composite Indices and Recent Planning Indicators 
 1 – Low demand 
urban 
2 – High demand, 
cautious planning 
stance 
3 – London 
Metropolitan 
4 – Pro-
development 
housing 
growth 
6 – Rural 
with varying 
planning 
stance 
Capacind -14.76 -26.16 -61.10 65.33 104.46 
Demind -49.34 33.19 60.95 30.36 2.36 
prevstance5 .38 -38.03 -10.11 40.46 8.59 
CurrOPInd2 -43.99 -1.08 20.15 113.61 8.32 
Budgind -32.10 51.60 -34.46 3.23 -7.12 
tkpct2 -4.79 -6.22 -4.59 -5.13 -2.32 
pppflow1213 .68 .77 .82 1.24 1.09 
 
To this typology County Councils and National Park Authorities are added as two distinct types. 
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Appendix 2: The Impact of Weighting on the Survey Results 
 
A2.1  Introduction 
This appendix applies weights to the survey data to explore the possible effects of under-representation 
of respondents from any of the LPA types. The analysis of the results is limited to the 183 responding 
unitary or lower tier authorities and excludes County Councils and National Park Authorities. The 
response rate from Unitary/lower tier is 56% of LAs, 59% weighted by households, and 63% weighted 
by recent housing output. The weighting applied here is based on 10 sub-cluster groups, that is the 5 
main cluster groups each subdivided by the index of recent/current output into lower and higher 
output groupings.  
A2.2 Overall Differences after Weighting 
Applying the weighting makes a modest difference to the results. The general direction of this 
difference is to make the results somewhat more negative towards perceived impact of the NHB. 
• ‘Good understanding’ – proportion ‘strongly agreeing’ drops from 53% to 49% 
• ‘Powerful incentive’  - balance of agree/disagree drops from 51/23 to 49/26 
• ‘Increased overall support’ – balance of agree/disagree drops from 40/34 to 39/37 
• ‘Support affordable homes’ – balance agree/disagree drops from 30/39 to 30/41. 
• ‘Reduce empty homes’ – balance agree/disagree rises from 48/26 to 50/23 
• ‘Local community support’ – balance agree/disagree drops from 10/58 to 7/64. 
• ‘Supportive elected members’ – balance agree/disagree drops from 40/31 to 35/32 
• ‘Strategic & coordinated approach’ – balance drops marginally from 31/39 to 30/39. 
• ‘Significant in public consultation’ – balance drops from 5/68 to 3/72. 
• ‘Number in Local Plan’ – balance drops from 11/65 to 8/70.  
• ‘How often planning officers take account’ – proportion ‘never’ rises from 53 to 55. 
• ‘Elected members take account of NHB receipts’ – little change 41% ‘never’.  
• ‘Enhances ability to promote new housing’ – balance agree/disagree drops from 34/41 to 
27/48.  
 
 
 
 
